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    This paper examines the impact of corporate governance on bank performance. Using 
a sample of China’s listed commercial banks from years 2007 to 2009,   we investigate how 
corporate governance practices affect the performance of China's listed banks during 
financial crisis. We use two-stage least squares (2SLS) regression to solve the well-known 
endogeneity problem in corporate governance literature, and compare our results to OLS 
regression of bank performance on governance mechanisms.   A number of interesting 
findings are yielded in our study.  First, there are an inverted U-shaped relation between 
board size and bank performance, and between proportion of independent directors and 
performance.  Second, the banks whose controlling shareholder is the State can generate 
better performance than other banks. Third, the shareholding of the largest shareholder affects 
bank performance but its effect is non-linear, while the shareholding of other large 
shareholders affects negatively on the bank performance. Fourth, executive compensation 
incentives have a significant positive impact on bank performance.  Our results are robust to 
various specifications. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
    Recently, a financial crisis from Wall Street has spread all over the world. This crisis, 
beginning with the failures of large financial institutions in the United States, has rapidly 
resulted in a number of European banks’ failures since the end of 2007. Banking crises have 
consequences due to poor governance of banks (Levine, 2004), and the possibility of broader 
macroeconomic implications. Although the effects of the sub-prime crisis on China’s banking 
industry were not as serious as European countries, indeed, it has the potential of negative 
impact on banking sectors. Thus, the current financial crisis has revived more concerns of 
corporate governance in the banking sector throughout the world.  
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) placed stronger emphasis on 
improving the corporate governance of financial entities. According to BCBS, “corporate 
governance for banking organizations is arguably of greater importance than for other 
companies, given the crucial financial intermediation role of banks in an economy” (BCBS, 
2005). In addition, previous research shows that weak corporate governance does not only 
lead to poor firm performance and risky financing patterns, but are also conducive to 
macroeconomic crises (Claessens et al. 2002), like the 1997 East Asia crisis. Other 
researchers contend that effective corporate governance is important for increasing investor 
confidence and market liquidity (Donaldson, 2003).  
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The purpose of this study is to investigate the relationship between corporate 
governance and performance in China’s banking sector during the financial crisis.  This study 
addresses the following specific questions.  How can corporate governance affect bank 
performance during a financial crisis? What are the main driving forces behind corporate 
governance on bank performance? How to ensure that managers follow the interests of 
shareholders in order to reduce agency problems which are related to bank governance? Even 
though a growing body of empirical research examines the structure and effectiveness of 
corporate governance system (Yermack, 1996), only a few studies focus on bank’s corporate 
governance (Adams and Mehran, 2005; Caprio et al., 2007; Levine, 2004; Macey and O’Hara, 
2003), especially in emerging markets. The effect of corporate governance on bank 
performance is still a relatively new topic for commercial banks in China.  Thus, this study 
bridges a gap in the literature and contributes to the understanding of corporate governance 
and performance of banks in China during financial crisis.  
    The increasing complexity of the banking sector aggravates the issue of asymmetry of 
information and diminishes stakeholders’ capacity to monitor bank managers’ decisions 
(Andres and Vallelado, 2008). Board compensation is a key mechanism to monitor managers’ 
behavior, because the role of boards as a mechanism for corporate governance of banks takes 
on special relevance in higher informational asymmetries due to the complexity of the 
banking business. Bank directors’ specific knowledge of the complexity of the banking 
business enables them to monitor and advise managers efficiently. 
Besides, the conflicting goals between shareholders and manager can introduce an 
agency problem. The manager’s self-interest could lead to the misuse of bank resources, for 
instance, through investing in risky projects or serving their own benefits (Jensen & Meckling, 
1976; Shleifer & Vishny, 1986). Hence, in order to control conflicts of interest and reduce 
agency problems in the banking sector, various internal and external tools which are known 
as corporate governance have been suggested.  
Given the unique features1 of China’s banking industry, our data sample includes 14 
commercial banks in China that are listed in Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges during 
years 2007 to 20092. We examine how various aspects of corporate governance affect bank 
performance by investigating empirically the determinants of board size and composition, 
board independence and functioning, executive compensation, and ownership structure.  Our 
empirical analysis employs an econometric model that incorporates 2SLS regression model in 
order to solve the well-known endogeneity problem in corporate governance research, which 
demonstrates the empirical superiority of 2SLS over OLS model.  
     Overall, we find that there is an inverted U-shaped relationship between board size 
and bank performance, and between the independent directors and bank performance. This 
indicates that an optimum mix of executive and independent directors is more adequate to 
create value for the banks than excessively independent boards. In terms of ownership 
structure, the banks whose controlling shareholder is the State can generate better 
performance than other banks.  Moreover, we find that ownership concentration is nonlinear 
                                                            
1   Since the banking sector in China has been undergoing a rapid change in ownership and governance 
evaluation, as a large country in emerging markets, large banks and business favor a model in which the state 
owns a large proportion of company shares.. 
2It contains 14 listed commercial banks in China during 2007 to 2009. The China’s listed banks include Industrial and Commercial Bank of 
China, China Construction Bank, Bank Of China, Agricultural Bank of China, Bank of Communications, Citic Bank, Bank of Beijing, Bank 
Of Nanjing, Bank of Ningbo, Shenzhen Development Bank.  
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related to bank performance in our sample.  In addition, we observe that executive’s 
ownership incentive have a positive impact on bank performance. Furthermore, the result 
suggests that executive compensation is an effective incentive mechanism in enhancing 
performance. Our results are robust to various specifications. 
We make several contributions to the literature. First, this study provides new 
insights on bank governance research in the emerging markets, especially during the financial 
crisis. This extension allows researchers to compare our findings with other countries and 
other periods. Second, we use appropriate statistical methods (2SLS model) to test how bank 
governance affects financial performance, which can deal with the endogeneity problem. 
Moreover, we compare 2SLS with OLS model to demonstrate that 2SLS model provides 
better identification in estimation.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly describes 
China's banking environment. Section 3 provides a brief literature review. Section 4 outlines 
the banking industry’s corporate governance issues and testable hypotheses. Section 5 
describes the data, variables, and methodology. Section 6 presents our empirical results and 
robust check. Section 7 concludes. 
 
2. CHINA’S BANKING ENVIRONMENT 
China’s banking sector has gone through significant reform in the past decade. Until 
2004, the big four commercial banks in China3 were still state-owned enterprises (SOEs). 
Beginning from the year 2005, the ownership structure of China’s major commercial banks 
has gradually changed. Strategic investors, both domestic and foreign, have become 
shareholders, and banks have been listed on various stock exchanges. Table 1 shows the 
statistics of the listed commercial bank in China, which includes the date of listing, stock 
exchanges and total capital of each bank from year 2005-2008.  
    After completing financial reorganization and restructuring, the China Construction 
Bank and Bank of Communications take the lead in listing on the Hong Kong Stock 
Exchange in 2005. Then, Bank of China & the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China 
(ICBC) were listed in Hong Kong, Shanghai Stock Exchanges in 2006 respectively.   The 
successful dual listing of China's commercial banks became known as the "A+H"4 shares 
listing model. Then there are six banks listed in the stock market in 2007.  As shown in Table 
1, there are 16 listed commercial banks in China until August, 2010. In figure 1 and figure 2, 
the results show that the capital ratio of many banks is almost 10%, while the total capital of 
the big four state-owned banks is higher than any other listed commercial banks in China. 
However, the current global financial crisis has exerted a potential pressure on 
Chinese banks. Since the end of 2008, the PBOC switched to a loose monetary policy in an 
effort to stem this financial crisis. Moreover, the Chinese government cut the interest rates 
and deposit reserve ratios. The government cut the loan rate by 0.27 percentage points for 
                                                            
3 Between 1979 and 1984, the Agricultural Bank of China (ABC), the Construction Bank of China (PCBC), the Bank of China (BOC), and 
the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) split off from the PBOC (People’s Bank of China), which retained its central bank 
role. 
4 “A+H” share listing model means that the bank listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange (A share) and Hong 
Kong Stock Exchange (H share) at the same time. 
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adding to official efforts to revive slowing economic growth. However, many problems affect 
the effectiveness of China’s banking industry, such as a rebound of non-performance loans, 
collateral of banks shrinking and the influence of overseas acquisitions and investments, 
which increase the potential risk in banking sectors. In the current complicated environment 
and grim economic situation, effective bank governance mechanism plays an important role 
in well-functioning of banks and increasing investors’ confidence. In this study, we 
investigate the impact of corporate governance on bank performance during this period. 
 
3. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Many empirical literatures focus on the issue of corporate governance (La porta et al., 
1998), previous studies on specific aspects of  corporate governance, such as board 
composition (e.g., Agrawal & Knoeber, 1996; Hermalin & Weisbach, 2003; Bhagat & Black, 
2002), executive compensation (e.g., Abowd & Kaplan, 1999; Bebchuk, Fried, &Walker, 
2002), and ownership concentration (e.g., Himmelberg, Hubbard, & Palia, 1999; Morck, 
Shleifer, & Vishny, 1988). 
However, it seems there is a lack of focus of corporate governance studies on the 
banking sector. The agency problems are particularly crucial for banks as they are opaque 
(Levine, 2003; Caprio and Levine, 2002) largely because of information asymmetries, which 
arising for financial intermediaries aggravated by the complexity of the bank business 
(Furfine, 2001; Levine, 2004).Thus, corporate governance in banks plays a special role in the 
economy due to banks’ high leverage and the uniqueness of these organizations. 
Pathan, Skully, Wickramanayake (2008) show a statistically significant negative 
relation between Thai banks’ board size and performances, while a statistically significant 
positive impact of the proportion of independent directors on the bank board and performance 
for 1999-2003. Pinteris (2002) documents a negative relationship between bank ownership 
concentration and bank performance in the Argentinean banking industry. Crespí, García-
Cestona, and Salas (2004) found a negative relationship between performance and 
governance intervention for Spanish banks, but these varied with different ownership 
structures or types of intervention. They find that internal governance works well for 
independent commercial banks whereas external governance (such as mergers) is better for 
savings banks. Adams and Mehran (2003) find bank holding companies in the US consists of 
relatively larger boards, but they find no consistent relationship between their board 
composition and performance. In addition, there are also some studies on this topic during or 
after financial crisis time. During the 1997 Asian financial crisis, the reforms in banking 
governance structure and cleaning up of nonperforming loans of financial institutions, has 
built a foundation upon which financial institutions operate with profitability and stability 
(Choea & Lee, 2003).Johnson, Boone, Breach and Friedman (2000) found that the Asian 
crisis in 1997 revealed the inherently weak corporate governance structure of the financial 
systems of the affected countries- Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Thailand and to a lesser extent 
to Philippines. Anderson and Campbell (2004) reached similar conclusions from their 
examination of 100 Tokyo Stock Exchange listed Japanese banks over 1985-1996. They 
found that the internal governance tools became more common after the Japanese crisis in the 
late 1980s. Choe and Lee’s (2003) finding that the Korean overall market index returns is 
Granger-caused by Korean bank sector returns especially after the crisis. 
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In general, although some empirical findings on corporate governance and 
performance in non-financial institutions are also applicable to banks in developed countries, 
there has been a paucity of research on the relationship between corporate governance and 
bank performance in developing countries, especially in China’s listed commercial banks. 
Our study of China’s commercial banks adds to the understanding of the importance of 
corporate governance in the banking sector during financial crisis. 
 
4. EMPIRICAL HYPOTHESES 
Adam and Mehran (2003) find a statistically significant positive relationship between 
board size and performance for the US bank-holding companies (BHCs) from 1986-1996, 
they might expect boards of directors to be larger, since a larger board facilitates manager 
supervision and brings more human capital to advise managers. In contrast, boards with too 
many members lead to problems of coordination, control, and flexibility in decision-making, 
which will harm the efficiency. Andres and Vallelado (2008) find the possibility of an 
inverted ‘U’ shape relationship between board size and bank performance by using a sample 
of 69 large commercial banks from six developed countries for the period 1995-2005. So, the 
impact of board size on bank performance is a trade-off between advantages (monitoring and 
advising) and disadvantages (coordination, control and decision-making problems). During 
current financial crisis, the effect of board size and bank performance is expected to be 
nonlinear. Therefore, based on the above discussion the following hypotheses are advanced.  
Hypothesis 1:   There is an inverted U-shaped relationship between board size and 
bank performance. 
The empirical findings on board independence and bank performance have been 
mixed. Prior studies show that a majority of independent directors are necessary for better 
bank governance (Skully, 2002). Others find there is an inverted U-shaped relation between 
outsider and bank performance (Andres and Valledo, 2008). In this study, we emphasize that 
an independent board of directors has fewer conflicts of interest when monitoring managers. 
Thus, when the monitoring function is prevalent, we expect that adding new independent 
directors to the board will improve the supervision of management and reduces the conflict of 
interest among stakeholders, but too many independent directors will destroy bank value 
because of the problems such as coordination and decision-making. According to this, it 
might have an optimum mix of executive and independent directors at a point, which is more 
adequate to create value for the banks than excessively independent boards. Thus, based on 
the above, the following hypothesis is examined: 
Hypothesis 2: There is an inverted U-shaped relation between proportion of 
independent directors on the board and bank’s performance. 
The analysis of the number of annual meeting needs to take into account the internal 
functioning of the board (Andres and Vallelado, 2008). In fact, one particularly important 
point which can affect how boards operate is the frequency of board meetings (Vafeas, 1999). 
The effect of the activity of a board yield either proactive or reactive results. Some evidences 
indicates that the impact of frequency of meetings on performance is positive. Meetings 
provide board members with the chance to discuss and exchange ideas on how they wish to 
monitor managers and bank strategy. Hence, the more frequent meetings provide a more 
relevant advisory role, which can enhance the performance. By contrast, frequent meetings 
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might also be a result of board reaction to poor performance. However, in this study, we 
expect the association between board meetings and bank value might be positive during the 
current financial crisis.  Because the relevance of the board’s advisory role can be increased 
by the complexity of the banking business, which the frequency of the meetings provides a 
more relevant advisory role and increases the bank value. Therefore, based on the above, the 
following hypothesis is examined. 
Hypothesis 3: the impact of the number of board Meetings on bank’s performance is 
a significant positive. 
One of the most important ways for a firm maximizing its value is through a well-
designed ownership structure of the firm’s shares (Bai et al., 2002). The results of these 
empirical studies, which primarily investigate the association between bank ownership and 
performance and that between ownership and efficiency, are mixed (Lin and Zhang, 2009). 
Hasan and Marton (2003), Jemric and Vujcic (2002), and Weill (2003) address that bank 
efficiency is positively related to foreign ownership as opposed to state ownership, while 
Nikiel and Opiela (2002) observe that domestic private banks are more profit efficient than 
foreign banks. During the financial crisis, the banks whose controlling shareholder is the state 
could benefit more from the support of government than the other banks. Furthermore, the 
listed banks whose controlling shareholder can always be the large banks in China, which the 
effects faltered from economic recession might be smaller than other banks. Therefore, we 
expect that state ownership banks can generate better performance than other banks during 
financial crisis. Accordingly, based on above discussion the following hypotheses are 
advanced. 
Hypothesis 4: the banks whose controlling shareholder is the State can generate 
better performance than other banks. 
In previous studies, there is disagreement over the impact of ownership structure 
(concentration) and bank performance (Griffith, Fogelberg and Weeks, 2002). Sun (2006) 
provides empirical studies for 9 commercial banks with 23 samples of annual reports during 
2001-2004. It found that concentration of bank ownership is a negative related to bank 
performance. However, using simple linear regression, Pi and Timme (1993) find bank 
performance (ROA) unrelated to institutional and large block-holders' ownership in large, 
publicly traded U.S. commercial banks. In this study, we indicate that the ownership 
concentration potentially has two conflicting effects on the quality of bank governance. When 
the largest shareholder increases his shareholding, the constraints from other shareholders 
become weaker, which gives the largest shareholder more discretionary powers of using the 
firm’s resources in the areas that only serve their own benefits. On the other hand, when the 
largest shareholder is exceedingly large (close to 100 percent of the bank) and therefore there 
is high degree of congruence between his interest and the bank’s interest, then ownership 
concentration may have a positive effect. So, we expect that there is a U-shaped relation 
between the concentration of its largest shareholder and bank performance. However, the 
concentration of other large shareholders (such as concentration of the second to the tenth 
largest shareholder’s holdings) other than the controlling shareholder increases the 
monitoring of the management and facilitates more effective contest for corporate control 
(Bai, Liu and Song, 2002). So it will help reduce the possibility of unconstrained large 
shareholders misusing firm resources and diminish the agency conflict in China’s listed banks. 
As expected, the impact of the concentration of other large shareholders on bank performance 
might be significantly positive. In line with the above discussion, the following hypothesis is 
examined. 
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Hypothesis 5: the shareholding of the largest shareholder affects negatively the bank 
value but its effect is non-linear, while the impact of the holding of other large shareholders 
on bank performance is positive.  
  CEO compensation might also prove an effective mechanism to deal with governance 
problems (Brickley and James, 1987; Crespí et al., 2004). The conflicts of interest that 
emerge between CEOs and the shareholders they represent are a classical example of the 
principal-agent problem (Crawford, Ezzell and Miles, 1995), and the primary means for 
shareholders to ensure that a manager takes optimal action is to tie his/her pay to the 
performance of the firm (Aggarawal & Samwick, 1999). Crawford, Ezzell and Miles (1995) 
posit that bank CEO compensation became more sensitive to performance as bank 
management became less regulated during year 1976-1981.Crespi-Cladera and Gispert (2003) 
established a positive relationship between changes in company performance and board 
remuneration within Spanish listed companies. Sun (2006) considers the CEO compensation 
is a positive related to bank performance. In order to effectively construct compensation 
contracts for mitigating these agency problems during a financial crisis, the relationship 
between compensation contracts is expected to affect the efficient incentive mechanisms, 
which inevitably enhances performance. In view of the foregoing discussion, the following 
hypothesis is examined. Hypothesis6: The higher level of executive’s compensation, the 
higher the level of bank performance. 
 
5. DATA, VARIABLES, AND ECONOMETRIC MODEL 
5.1. Data 
Our sample includes data for all China’s listed commercial banks in the Shanghai and 
Shenzhen Stock Exchanges from years 2007 to 2009.To assemble the panel data, we obtained 
our data on board size, composition, ownership concentration, executive compensation and 
other corporate governance variables  from China Stock Market Accounting Research 
(CSMAR) Database. We also obtained complementary information from financial statements 
of the China’s listed commercial banks, which are reported in  each bank’s websites. 
Eliminating  banks with missing data for any of the variables, our dataset includes 14 listed 
commercial banks based on data availability.  This sample selection procedure yields 41 
bank-year observations for a 3-year period. Financial data refer to the end of the year.    
     Although the 14 listed commercial banks in the sample represent only part of the 
total number of quoted banks in China, but they are represented by large commercial banks 
that account for large banking industry assets, equity, loans, or deposits. Thus, our sample is 
representative of China’s banking industry.      
5.2. Variables and Statistics 
    5.2.1. Dependent Variable (Bank Performance indicators)   
The main independent variable of interest is bank’s financial performance. According 
to previous corporate governance research, we measure bank performance by using ROE, 
which is return on average equity. ROE are used widely to assess bank performance (Knapp, 
Gart and Becher 2005; Choi and Hasan 2005; and Shen and Chang 2006). Moreover, the use 
of ROE facilitates comparisons with other non-banking studies.ROE is calculated as the ratio 
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of net profit to total bank equity. Table 2 presents the descriptions of variables. Table 3 
provides summary statistics for selected variables that describe the governance structures and 
bank performance of our sample. The average ROE across banks and time is 16.64%. The 
maximum of this performance variable is 30.02% with a minimum of 3.74%. 
                             
 Bank governance would be involved in the mechanism of board size and composition, 
executive compensation, ownership structure and other variables. We measure bank 
governance by using independent variables as follows. 
    5.2.2. Independent Variables (Bank Governance) 
     The first group of independent variables measures the board size. The board of 
directors' role in effective corporate governance has become especially important to banks 
and their regulators following the Asian financial crisis in 1997 (Pathan, Skully, & 
Wickramanayke, 2007). We measure board size with the variable BS, which is the total 
number of directors on the bank board. According to Andres and Vallelado (2008), we also 
add the variable BS_sq, which is square of the board size, for the possibility of  an inverted 
‘U’ shape  association between board size and performance (Yermack, 1996)  As reported in 
Table3, the mean sizes of the board are 16.05 and 16 directors for the period 2007-2009, 
respectively, which is higher than the average board size (12) reported for 452 U.S non-
financial firms between 1984 and 1991  (Yermack, 1996), but close to the 17 directors 
obtained by Adams and Mehran (2005) in the period 1995–1999 for banks. 
The second group variable is board composition and board independence. We 
measure the composition of the board of directors by using the proportion of executive 
directors (PED), which we define as the number of executive directors to the total number of 
board directors. Table 3 shows that the executive directors range from 2 to 16.  On average, 
the executive directors account for 51% of directors. In addition, we define a variable PID as 
proportion of the number of independent directors on the board. Table 3 reports the mean 
bank board comprises 16 directors, which indicates eight outsider and eight insiders. This 
50% is below  the Adams and Mehran’s (2005) data that outsiders account for 68.7% of 
directors. On average, the independent directors account for 34.8% of all directors. 
  
       
  The third group of independent variables is the functioning of boards. As our proxy 
for the functioning of boards of directors, we define a variable (Meeting) as the number of 
meetings held in a bank each year.  Table 3 shows an average number of meetings of 10.4, 
which is close to the 10.45 meetings reported by Andres and Vallelado (2008).    The fourth 
group variable is Ownership structure, which are important factors in determining 
performance. Pinteris (2002) reports that banks with a more concentrated ownership structure 
exhibit higher loan-portfolio risk. He explains the finding as an illustration of ownership 
concentration exacerbating agency conflicts, specifically between bank owners and bank 
depositors. We define a variable (State) as a dummy variable with a value of 1 if a majority 
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     Table 2 Descriptions of variables 
Bank Performance  
ROE Ratio of earnings before interest and taxes to the average total bank 
equity at the end of year t. 
Corporate Governance Variables  
BS  Total number of directors on the board in each bank at the end of year t.  
PED Ratio of the number of executive directors to the total number of board 
directors in each bank at the end of year t.  
PID Ratio of the number of independent directors to the total number of board 
directors in each bank at the end of year t. 
Meeting The number of meetings held by board in each bank at the end of year t. 
State A dummy variable with a value of 1 if a majority of the firm’s stock is in 
the hand of state, and 0 otherwise. 
Top1 Ratio of Shares held by the largest shareholder to total shares at the end 
of year t. 
Top1_sq The sum square of the shareholding from the largest shareholder at the 
end of year t.  
Csh The concentration of shareholder’s holding from 2nd to 10th at the end of 
year t. 
CEOpay The natural logarithm of the sum of  top3  executives’ pay of the bank at 
the end of year t. 
Control variables  
Size Natural logarithm of the average total assets of bank.  
Leverage  Ratio of debt to the total assets as at the end of each year.  
NPL Ratio of non-performance loan to gross loans in each bank at the end of 
year t. 
yeardummy Year dummy variable. 
 
 
of the firm’s stock is in the hands of the state, and 0 otherwise. According to Bai et.al (2006), 
we define a variable Top1 as the Ratio of Shares held by the largest shareholder to total 
shares. To capture the potential nonlinear effect of shareholding concentration on bank 
governance, we add variable Top1_sq, which means the sum square of the shareholding from 
the largest shareholder, to present the concentration of the largest shareholder. In addition, we 
measure the ownership concentration with another variable CSh, which is the concentration 
of shareholder’s holding from 2nd to 10th. Table 3 reports the mean of the variable State is 
78.57%. On average, the top shareholder’s holding, Top1, is 27.44%, with highest value more 
than 67.53%. Moreover, the mean and the standard deviation for the concentration of the 
second to the tenth largest shareholders, Csh, are 36.33% and 11.67%, with lowest at 14.31% 
to highest 60.40%.  The last group of variables is executive compensation. The level of 
executive’s compensation (CEOpay) is defined as the natural logarithm of the sum of the 
top3  executives’ pay of the bank.  The CEOpay ranges from 14.44 to 17.24 with a mean 
value of 15.84 for the period of 2007-2009.  
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    5.2.3. Control Variable 
We examine the association between bank governance and performance by 
controlling a set of variables, including bank size, leverage, non-performance loan, and year. 
The first control variable is bank size (Size). Evidence in (Chen and Metcalf, 1980) indicates 
that firm size may confound relationships between ownership structure and bank performance. 
Cho (1985) discusses several proxies of bank size such as size of equity capital, size of 
deposits, total assets and the number of countries of operation. Here we measure bank size by 
the natural logarithm of the bank’s average total assets.  
 
The second control variable is Leverage. Opler and Titman (1994) find that firms that 
maintain a high leverage ratio and have specialized business lines tend to experience more 
difficulties during economic downturns. Therefore, bank leverage can affect bank governance. 
We use Leverage ratio as control variables for the risk factors of bank. Leverage is measured 
as the ratio of total debt to total bank assets. The mean of the Leverage is   
  
The third control variable is non-performance loans (NPL). We measure NPL by 
using non-performing loans divided by total loans of the bank. 
 
The last control variable is year dummy in order to control the year’s effect on the 
sample. 
In table 4, we reported the correlations matrix for the variables used in the model.  
 
     Table 3 Summary Statistics 
 
This is summary statistics for China’s listed commercial bank from Dec. 2007 to Dec. 2009. All variables 
are defined in Table 2. This table is include the mean value (Mean) within the sample, the standard 
deviation (SD) of observations, lowest and highest observation (Min and Max), and number of 
observations (N). 
 
Variable N Mean SD Min Max 
Bank Performance 
ROE 42 0.16643 0.04943 0.03744 0.30029 
Corporate Governance Variables 
BS 41 16.04878 1.80210 11.00000 19.00000 
BS_sq 41 260.73170 56.82958 121.00000 361.00000 
PED 41 0.51127 0.23735 0.13333 1.00000 
PID 41 0.34802 0.06871 0.22222 0.63636 
Meeting 42 10.40476 4.21993 5.00000 24.00000 
State 42 0.78571 0.41530 0.00000 1.00000 
Top1 42 27.47679 19.35140 5.90000 67.53000 
Top1_sq 42 0.11205 0.14889 0.00348 0.45603 
Csh 42 36.33341 11.67285 14.31000 60.40000 
CEOpay 41 15.84365 0.71692 14.44252 17.23586 
Control Variables 
Size 42 27.77086 1.39497 25.04754 30.09785 
Leverage 42 0.93960 0.02297 0.86929 0.97796 
NPL 42 0.00016 0.00009 0.00004 0.00056 
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5.3 The Econometric Model 
    To test our hypothesis, we build the following models to examine the impact of 
corporate governance on performance of China's listed commercial banks. We address the 
relationship between bank governance and performance by using a two-stage least-squares 
regression (2SLS) to solve the endogeineity problem. We also compare the results to OLS 
model. 
    5.3.1 OLS model 
 
   
                     (1) 
Where the β parameters are the estimated coefficients for the constant and each of the 
explanatory variables included in the model, and is an error term. In equation (1), the 
primary dependent variable (Bank performancei, t ) in the regression is ROE, which presents 
the ratio of return on equity of bank i at time t. The independent variables include board size 
and composition, board independence and functioning, ownership structure, CEO 
compensation, and several control variables. All variables are defined in Table 2. 
    5.3.2 2SLS model 
Previous studies suggest that some of our independent variables such as executive 
compensation might be determined simultaneously with the dependent variable (bank 
performance). The executive compensation might arise endogenously as a function of other 
variables, such as bank performance, board size, ownership concentration. Holthausen and 
Larcker (1993) find a positive relationship between board size and executive compensation.  
Therefore, we need to use this panel data and an econometric method to solve the well-known 
engogeneity problem.  We use two-stage least-squares regression (2SLS) to deal with the 
causality of the empirical relationship. 
 
 
                                       
                                                    (2) 
Where the β parameters are the estimated coefficients for the constant and each of the 
explanatory variables included in the model, and is an error term. In equation (2), the 
endogenous variable related to bank performance is CEOpay, which is the natural logarithm 
of the sum of  top3  executives’ pay of the bank I at the end of year t. the primary dependent 
variable (  ) in the regression is ROE, which present the ratio of return 
on equity of bank i at time t.. The independent variables include board size and composition, 
board independence and functioning, ownership structure, CEO compensation, and several 
control variables.  All variables are defined in Table 2. 
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6. REGRESSION RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
6.1 Multivariate Analyses 
In this section, we employ 2SLS model in our regression and compare the results with 
the OSL model, when we control the endogeneity problem. Our purpose is not only to 
facilitate the comparability of our results with previous researches but also to show the results 
of China’s listed commercial banks during the financial crisis by extending the examination 
of banks performance to an emerging market.    Table 5 and Table 6 show the results of OLS 
and 2SLS regression respectively for the correlation between corporate governance and bank 
performance. The results are basically consistent with our hypothesis. In Table 5, we use 
bank governance variables as discussed earlier, controlling for size, leverage, NPL and year 
in column (2) to (6). The results are consistent with each column shown in the Table 4. 
However, when the 2SLS procedure is used to solve the endogeneity problem shown in Table 
6, the significant effects of Meeting on bank performance disappears, which indicates that 
OLS regression of bank performance on corporate governance mechanisms may be 
misleading in some way and demonstrates the empirical superiority of 2SLS over OLS model. 
Moreover, other results of OLS model are similar to 2SLS model. Thus, we focus on the 
results of 2SLS model as followings.    On board size, the results show that there is a negative 
relationship between BS_sq and ROE ratio at level in table 6, which is consistent with our 
hypothesis 1, This result, consistent with that of Andres and Vallelado (2008), implies an 
inverted U-shaped relation between board size and ROE ratio. Thus, the negative and 
significant coefficient of BS_sq shows that there is a point at which adding a new director 
reduces bank value. The result is rather surprising and contrary to studies conducted by 
Jensen (1993), Lipton & Lorsch (1992), who view that there exists a linear relationship 
between board size and ROE. However, this confirms that in China larger boards are better 
for bank performance up to a certain limit during financial crisis, because the oversized 
boards will destroy the bank value and outweigh their advantages (Yermack, 1996).   
On board composition and board independence, the study shows that the association 
between the proportion of executive directors and ROE is not significant. However, the 
results suggest that the relationship between proportion of independent directors and ROE is 
positive significant at level 5%, which indicates that the more independent directors there are 
on a bank's board will improve the performance, but too many independent directors also will 
destroy the bank values. Such a relationship establishes an optimum point at which the 
proportion of independent directors on the board destroys value. The result is consistent with 
our Hypothesis 2, which also confirms an inverted U-shaped relation between the proportion 
of independent directors and ROE.  It confirms that the impact of proportion of independent 
directors on bank performance is a trade-off between advantages and disadvantages. Thus, an 
optimum mix of executive and independent directors is more adequate to create value for the 
banks than excessively independent boards (Andres and Vallelado, 2008). 
On a functioning of boards,   the results suggest that there is no impact on the number 
of board meetings on ROE, which is not consistent with our hypothesis 3. The result is 
contrary to studies conducted by Jensen (1993), Lipton & Lorsch (1992). 
On ownership structure, the results of the study suggest that the banks whose 
controlling shareholder is the state is more significant positively related to ROE than other 
banks at level 1%, which is consistent with hypothesis 4. Moreover, the association between 
Top1_sq and ROE is significant positive at 1%, while the impact of Csh on ROE is 
significant negatively in the overall sample at level 5%. The results are contrary to our  
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hypothesis 5.Theoretically, top1_sq is expected to have a negative impact on the bank 
performance and Csh is a positive effects. However, the results are opposite to our hypothesis. 
One possible reason for the interest finding of China’s listed commercial banks during the 
financial crisis may be related to China’s macroeconomic policies and government 
intervention at this special time. It shows the fact that the bank will benefit more when 
holding of the largest shareholding is appropriate. However, it leads the ownership 
concentration to exacerbate more agency conflicts, specifically between bank owners and 
bank depositors, when the largest shareholder holds too many shares of the bank. In this 
situation, the large shareholder may be against the interests of minority shareholders and 
induce the moral hazard behavior.  The results indicate that the association between 
shareholding of the largest shareholder and bank performance is inverted U-shape during the 
financial crisis. In addition, the results show that the shareholding of other large shareholders 
has a negative impact on bank performance, which implies that the other large shareholders 
cannot monitor the largest shareholder effectively during financial crisis, which might be 
different from the other periods.  
The study points to the fact that executive’s pay has a positive impact on bank 
performance. This is significant at level 10% in the overall sample as the results indicate. 
Compensation contracts are therefore seen as a remedy to the principal agent problem. 
Besides this, short term and long term incentive plans benefit shareholders by incentivizing 
managers to perform better in their own interests. Furthermore, our results suggest that at 
least in China’s banking, the incentive of executive’s pay is directly linked to bank 
performance. The executive’s compensation plays an important role in affecting the efficient 
incentive mechanisms, which inevitably enhances performance. 
6.2 Robust Check 
This section presents additional tests to examine the effects of bank governance on 
performance, and investigate whether the main findings are robust to alternative 
specifications. ROE is the most common measure of performance in corporate governance 
literatures, and we also use another accounting-based performance measure ROA (return on 
assets) to repeat the analysis in OLS and 2SLS regression model.  Both of ROA and ROE are 
widely used as a measure of bank performance in studies on the banking industry (Cornett, 
Ors, & Tehranian, 2002; Magnan & St-Onge, 1997).  Table 7 shows our results of robust 
check for changes in the dependent variable, the results of OLS regression are presented in 
Panel A and the results of 2SLS regression are presented in Panel B. The specification 
yielded equivalent results to those presented in Table 5 and Table 6, excepting Hypothesis 6. 
In general, this specification does not qualitatively modify our primary findings.   
 
7. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH AGENDA 
Since the global economies have been significantly shaken all over the world, banks 
corporate governance become more important for stability and profitability of the banking 
sector. There is little study in the literature that has examined the effects of corporate 
governance on bank performance in emerging markets during the economic crises. This study 
employs China’s listed commercial bank data from Dec. 2007 to Dec. 2009.  
In sum, our results suggest that how corporate governance affects China’s listed 
commercial bank performance during financial crisis depends heavily on the country’s  
Corporate Governance and Performance of Listed Commercial Banks during Financial Crisis 
18                     Journal of the Washington Institute of China Studies, Winter 2011, Vol. 5, No. 4, p1-21     
 
 
Table 7 Coefficient estimates from OLS and 2SLS regressions of ROA on bank governance 
This table shows OLS and 2SLS regression results that investigate the impacts of bank governance on 
China’s listed commercial bank performance. The sample consists of China’s listed commercial banks 
over the period of Dec. 2007–Dec. 2009, which is the period in the financial crisis. The dependent 
variable in the regression is ROA, which is the ratio of return on average assets. The independent 
variables and control variables are defined in table 2. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 
5%, and 1% level, respectively. p-value in parentheses. 
 
Ind. V.:  Panel A: OLS Panel B: 2SLS 
ROA Coef. t (P>t) Coef. t (P>t) 
BS 0.00669  2.18** 0.00736  1.93* 
    (0.039)   (0.066*) 
BS_sq -0.00019  -2.00* -0.00021  -1.78* 
    (0.057)   (0.087) 
PED 0.00410  1.59 0.00251  0.84 
    (0.125)   (0.408) 
PID 0.01156  1.72* 0.01386  1.58 
    (0.099)   (0.127) 
Meeting 0.00024  2.81** 0.00018  1.71* 
    (0.01)   (0.099) 
State 0.00291  2.64** 0.00527  2.52** 
    (0.014)   (0.019) 
Top1 0.00026  2.01*     
    (0.056)     
Top1_sq -0.03857  -2.58** -0.01601  -2.42** 
    (0.017)   (0.023) 
Csh -0.00006  -1.55 -0.00007  -1.53 
    (0.134)   (0.14) 
CEOpay 0.00088  1.31 0.00254  1.52 
    (0.204)   (0.141) 
Size 0.00073  1.51 0.00157  2.42** 
    (0.145)   (0.023) 
Leverage -0.13156  -6.26*** -0.15723  -4.68*** 
    (0.000)   (0.000) 
NPL 4.80003  1.2 7.16732  1.38 
    (0.244)   0.179 
yeardummy   Yes   yes 
_cons 0.02798  0.95 0.00072  0.02 
    (0.354)   (0.986) 
F   5.5   3.71 
Prob > F   0.0001   0.0021 
R-squared   0.7745   0.6305 
Adj R2   0.6336   0.4236 
 
 
institutional background. On board, the regression results show that an inverted U-shaped 
relation between board size and bank performance, and between the proportion of 
independent directors and bank performance. This result strengthens the hypothesis that the 
incorporation of outsiders improves bank value up to a certain limit. This is important to 
perform efficiently and it should advise more independence in boards to monitor the manager, 
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but too many independent directors face considerable problems of coordination, 
communication and decision making. In view of this, during the financial crisis we suggest to 
increase the proportion of independent directors and ensure their professional quality in 
China up to a certain limit. Thus, in order to establish independent, efficient boards and 
enhance internal monitor mechanisms, an optimum mix of executive and independent 
directors is more adequate to create value for the banks than excessively independent boards 
during financial crisis.  
However, Evidence indicates that there is a significant negative association between the 
executive director and bank performance, while the board composition rather pointed out that the 
more independent the board is, the worse the profitability of overall sample. 
On ownership structure, Evidence indicates that there is a more significant positive 
association between State-owned banks and bank performance than non-state owned banks. In 
addition, we find that the ownership concentration is negatively related to performance of listed 
commercial banks in China. This indicates that ownership concentration can destroy bank value in 
emerging markets, where agency problems are far more severe and where monitoring by banks is 
compromised by the legal environment. In this situation, it may adjust the ownership structure to 
improve the corporate governance, therefore enhancing the operational efficiency. 
On executive compensation, the study points to the fact that a significant positive relationship 
exits between executive compensation and bank performance. Our results suggest that at least in 
China’s banking system, executive’s pay is directly linked to bank performance. In order to reduce the 
principal agent problem, it should establish a rational compensation mechanism and this incentive 
plan benefits shareholders by incentivizing managers to perform better in their interests. Furthermore, 
our results suggest that in China’s banking system, the executive’s compensation plays an important 
role in affecting the efficient incentive mechanisms, which inevitably enhances performance. 
    Given the evidence on corporate governance and bank performance in emerging markets,  an 
important future extension of the current study will be to compare the difference in bank governance 
mechanism or the important factors that affect bank performance between developed and developing 
countries. 
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